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And Into the Maelstrom Steps the United
States Supreme Court: Licenses
Are Not "Property" for Purposes of the Mail
Fraud Statute
Cleveland v. United States'
I. INTRODUCTION

Consider this scenario: An individual applies for a state hunting license and
the individual decides to falsify some information in the license application. The
individual places the application in the mailbox and receives a "fraudulently
procured" hunting license in a few days. Unfortunately, because the individual
has used the United States mails to carry out her fraudulent scheme, she is
subject to federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Section 1341 ("the mail fraud
statute"). One problem arises however: has the state been deprived of
"property" for purposes of the mail fraud statute? This deceptively simple issue
had caused disarray in the federal courts until the United States Supreme Court
stepped in to resolve the conflict. This Note will begin by providing a summary
of the facts surrounding Cleveland v. United States. Following this synopsis is
a brief discussion of the mail fraud statute, the property dilemma arising under
the mail fraud statute, and issues relating to the federalization of crime. This
Note will conclude by exploring the federalism implications of the Supreme
Court's holding in Cleveland v. United States, which held that, absent a clear
statement from Congress, licenses are not property for purposes of the mail fraud
statute.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
The State of Louisiana grants certain businesses, after obtaining a license,
the privilege of operating video poker machines.2 In 1992, Fred Goodson and

1. 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
STAT. ANN. §§ 27:301-:324 (West 2001). A license is
required for potential owners of video game poker machines. Id. § 27:306. Licenses
must be renewed annually, Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 15 (citing LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 42, §
2405(B)(3) (2000)), and are non-transferable. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:311 (G) (West
2001). The issuance of a license is contingent upon a demonstration by the
applicant/licensee that she has good character and financial integrity and is, therefore,
suitable to receive the license. Id. § 27:3 10.

2. Id. at 15; see LA. REV.
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his family formed a limited partnership, Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. ("TSG"), to
take part in the video poker business at their truck stop in Slidell, Louisiana
Goodson hired Carl W. Cleveland, a New Orleans attorney, to assist him in
executing TSG's application for a video poker license from the State of
Louisiana.4 In the application, TSG was required to list all of its partners and
have these partners submit personal financial statements.' In addition, TSG was
required to certify that: (1) the enumerated partners were the lone beneficial
owners of TSG, (2) that none of the enumerated partners held an interest in the
partnership solely as an agent or nominee, and (3) none of the enumerated
partners planned on transferring the interest in the future. 6
TSG's application provided that Goodson's adult children, Alex and Maria
Goodson ("Alex and Maria"), were the lone beneficial owners of the
partnership.7 The application also stated that Alex and Maria had received all of
the start-up capital for TSG from Cleveland's law firm and Goodson and that
Goodson was TSG's general manager.8 The State of Louisiana approved the
application in May 1992 and issued TSG a license to operate video poker
machines. 9 Successful renewals of the license occurred in 1993, 1994, and 1995,
and the subsequent renewal applications continued to list Alex and Maria as the
lone beneficial owners.'"
In 1996, the FBI found evidence implicating Goodson and Cleveland in a
scheme to bribe state legislators to induce the legislators to vote in support of the
video poker industry." As a result, the federal government indicted Goodson
and Cleveland on several counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. Section
195712 and racketeering and conspiracy under Section 1962.' 3 The predicate acts
forming the basis of the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO")

3. Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 15.

4. Id. at 16.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The statute prohibits "various activities designed to conceal or promote
'specified unlawful activity."' Id. at 16 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000)).

"[S]pecified unlawful activity" is defined as "any act or activity constituting an offense

listed in section 1961(1) of this title." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (2000).
13. Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 16. The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") prohibits "participation and conspiracy to participate in a
pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 16 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),(d) (2000)).
The statute defines "racketeering activity" to include "any act which is indictable under
... Section 1341." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).
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charge included four counts of mail fraud under Section 1341.4 The
government alleged that Goodson and Cleveland had violated Section 1341 by
fraudulently concealing in the TSG license application and subsequent renewals
mailed to the state that they were the true owners of TSG. 5 The government
claimed that the reason Goodson and Cleveland concealed their ownership
interests in TSG was to prevent the state from discovering certain tax and
financial problems, problems that would have substantially weakened their
likelihood of obtaining a license.' 6
Prior to the commencement of the prosecution, Cleveland filed a motion to
dismiss the mail fraud counts, arguing that the state had not been deprived of
"property" as required under Section 1341." The district court denied the
motion, holding that "licenses constitute property even before they are issued."' 8
Subsequently, ajury found Cleveland guilty on two counts of mail fraud and one
count each of money laundering, racketeering, and conspiracy based upon the
mail fraud and sentenced him to 121 months in a federal penitentiary.'9
Cleveland appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, arguing that the State of Louisiana did not give up "property" when
it issued the license and was, therefore, not deprived of "property" for purposes
of the mail fraud statute. 2' The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the
conviction and sentence.2 ' Noting a conflict among the circuits, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the court
of appeals.22 The Court found that Louisiana's licensing scheme constituted a
regulatory, rather than a property, interest. 23 Further, the Court held that it would
not interpret the mail fraud statute as granting the federal government the power

14. Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 16. The mail fraud statute states, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises,... for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, [uses the mails or causes them to be
used], shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,

or both.
Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 16 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (amended 2002)

(alterations in original)).
15. Id. at 17.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21. Id. at 18. The Fifth Circuit held that "Louisiana video poker licenses constitute

'property' in the hands of the State." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 21.
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to oversee conduct "traditionally policed by the States," absent a clear statement
by Congress.24 For the above reasons, the Court held that Section 1341 "requires
the object of the fraud to be 'property' in the victim's hands and that a Louisiana
video poker license in the State's hands is not 'property' under [Section] 1341."25
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The FederalMail FraudStatute
Since its enactment, the federal mail fraud statute has developed into a
powerful prosecutorial weapon.26 Under the statute, federal prosecutors are
granted jurisdiction when a person uses the mails to effectuate a scheme or
artifice to defraud.27 To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 1341, the
government must prove that a defendant committed: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2)
with the intent to defraud, and (3) used the United States mails or a private
interstate commercial carrier in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.28
The modem mail fraud statute, of which Section 1341 is a part, was
originally enacted in 1872 as part of the recodification of the postal laws.29 The
original statute made it a misdemeanor for "any person having devised or
intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or be effected by either
opening or intending to open correspondence or communication with any other
person... by means of post-office establishment of the United States."3 While
the legislative history for the mail fraud statute is sparse, 3' a statement from a
member of the House of Representatives noted that the statute was intended "to

24. Id. at 27.
25. Id. at 26-27.
26. Anne S. Dudley & Daniel F. Schubert, Mail and Wire Fraud,38 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1025, 1025 (2001).
27. Jonathan Lemann, Comment, Big Brother & the Gambling Company: The
FederalRegulation of Louisiana's GamingIndustry Under the Mail FraudStatute, 44
LoY. L. REv. 785, 786 (1999).
28. Dudley & Schubert, supra note 26, at 1029.
29. Christopher Q. Cutler, McNally Revisited: The "MisrepresentationBranch"
of the Mail FraudStatute a Decade Later, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 77, 78 (1998). The origin
of the modem mail fraud statute was the Postal Act of 1868. The Postal Act made it
"unlawful to use the mail to send letters or circulars concerning lotteries or similar
enterprises." Dudley & Schubert, supra note 26, at 1049 n.3. The Postal Act was
recodified in 1872, "creating legislation that would be the predecessor of the modem mail
fraud statute." Id.
30. Lemann, supra note 27, at 787-88 (quoting Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 355, § 301,
17 Stat. 283, 323).
31. Jed S. Rakoff, The FederalMail FraudStatute (Part1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 77 1,
779-80 (1980).
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prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities... by thieves,
forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the
innocent people in the country."32 The courts applying the statute initially
presumed that the purpose of the statute was to preserve the integrity of the
postal service.33 The statute survived two early constitutional challenges3" and
has been amended numerous times during its history."
While the original purpose of the mail fraud statute was limited to the
preservation of the integrity of the postal service by preventing frauds on the
public through the use of such service, the statute has taken a course of "rapid
expansion" and is now a means for the government to prosecute numerous types
of criminal activity in the public and private sectors.36 The statute covers "not
only the full range of consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, bank frauds,
insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, but [also] ... such areas as blackmail,
counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery."37 Thus, the mail fraud statute has
extended far beyond the mere preservation of postal integrity and now grants
federal jurisdiction in cases involving a wide range of frauds.38 Furthermore,
slow congressional response in fighting crime has turned the mail fraud statute
into a "'first line of defense' serving as a 'stop-gap device which would permit
the prosecution of newly conceived frauds until such time that Congress enacted

32. Cutler, supra note 29, at 79 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,
356 (1987) (quoting Remarks of John Franklin Farnsworth, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong.,
3d Sess. 35 (1870)).
33. Dudley & Schubert, supra note 26, at 1026; see Durland v. United States, 161
U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
34. Michael C. Bennett, Note, Borrev. United States: An ImproperInterpretation
ofProperty Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1993). One such attack occurred in
the 1877 case Ex Parte Jackson,96 U.S. 727 (1877). In Jackson, the defendants argued
that a postal law precluding the mailing of advertisements for illegal lotteries was beyond
the scope of Congress's regulatory powers. Id. at 728. The Court rejected this argument,
noting that "the power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal
system of the country. The right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves
the right to determine what shall be excluded." Id. at 732.
35. One recent amendment was in response to the Court's holding in McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). The Court held that the statutory phrase "scheme
to defraud" did not include the intangible right to "good government" or "honest
services." Id. at 356. Congress quickly overturned McNally in 1988 through the
enactment of Section 1346. Dudley & Schubert, supra note 26, at 1036. This
congressional action "clarified that the mail and wire fraud statutes extended to any
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." Id.
36. Lemann, supra note 27, at 786.
37. Dudley & Schubert, supranote 26, at 1026-27 (quoting Rakoff, supranote 31,
at 772).
38. Dudley & Schubert, supra note 26, at 1026.
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particularized legislation to cope with new frauds."' 39 The mail fraud statute,

therefore, has been described as a federal prosecutor's "secret weapon."" One
oft-quoted remark characterizes the mail fraud statute as a federal prosecutor's:
Stradivarious, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and
our true love. We may flirt with RICO, show off 1Ob-5, and call the
conspiracy law "darling," but we always come home to the virtues of
18 U.S.C. 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable
familiarity. It understands4us and, like many a foolish spouse, we like
to think we understand it. 1
B. The PropertyDilemma SurroundingLicenses
Whether a license constitutes a governmental property interest is an issue
that has created a maelstrom in the federal courts. 4' The basic problem lies in
determining whether an individual who has fraudulently procured a license has
received "property" for purposes of the mail fraud statute.43 While the problem
seems simple on its face, the various courts that have addressed the issue have
produced clashing results and a dizzying array of rationales to support those
results."
A majority of courts that have addressed the issue have found that a state
does not have a property interest in a license.45 These courts espouse the theory
that a license becomes property in the licensee's hand but is not property in the
hands of a state. 46 The license, according to these courts, represents a state's
regulatory, rather than a property, interest. 47 As one court has put it, "from the

39. Lemann, supra note 27, at 791 (quoting Christopher G. Green & Christopher
P. Hammon, Mail and Wire Fraud,35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 943, 944 (1998)).
40. Lemann, supra note 27, at 791.
41. Rakoffsupra note 31, at 771.
42. Donna M. Maus, Comment, License Procurementandthe FederalMail Fraud
Statute, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 1125, 1132 (1991).
43. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of
Intangible PropertyRights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 683, 708.
44. Id. at 712.
45. See, e.g.,United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11 th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410,418 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d
1183, 1194 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir.
1990); Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kato,
878 F.2d 267, 268-69 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dadanian, 856 F.2d 1391, 1391
(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248, 254 (6th Cir. 1988).
46. See supra note 45.
47. See supra note 45.
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government's perspective.., the license is a promise not to interfere rather than
a sliver of property.""8
The Second Circuit subscribed to this "regulatory" theory in United States
v. Schwartz.49 In Schwartz, three defendants fraudulently procured arms export
licenses and were convicted under the wire fraud statute.5" After concluding that
wire fraud violations are subject to the same analysis as mail fraud violations, the
court held that the state's interest in an export license was a regulatory rather
than a property interest. 5 Reversing the conviction, the court noted that "the
government's power to regulate does not a fortiori endow it with a property
interest in the license."52 Moreover:
The government's interest in issuing its license ancillary to its
regulatory program is no different than its interest in propounding and
enforcing its other regulations with broad based applications that do
not include the issuance of licenses. Whether it chooses to use
licenses or blanket rules, the government's purpose is to control the
private use of private property. Thus, a regulatory license is nothing
more than a formal embodiment of "the necessary government
approval." 3
In contrast, other courts have held that a state does have a property interest
in its licenses and have produced various other rationales to support their
decisions.5 4 Some courts have reasoned that because a license is property in the
hands of the licensee, the license is also property in the hands of the
government. 5 Other courts have argued that a license, as a physical document,
has a certain physical quality and, therefore, "the physical manifestation belongs
to the state." 6 "The paper, ink, and even '23 pieces of tin' that authorize the

48. Bennett, supra note 34, at 1529 (quoting Toulabi, 875 F.2d at 125).
49. 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991).
50. Lemann, supra note 27, at 800 (citing Schwartz, 924 F.2d at 413).
51. Lemann, supra note 27, at 800 (citing Schwartz, 924 F.2d at 416-17).
52. Lemann, supra note 27, at 800 (quoting Schwartz, 924 F.2d at 417).
53. Lemann, supra note 27, at 801 (quoting Schwarz, 924 F.2d at 417).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Bankston, 182 F.3d 296,309 (5th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Salvatore, I 10 F.3d 1131, 1143 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bucuvalas, 970
F.2d 937, 945 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 959 (1992); Borre v. United States, 940
F.2d 215, 222 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709, 715 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1027 (1990); United States v. Turoff, 701 F. Supp. 981, 991
(E.D.N.Y. 1988).
55. See Moobr, supra note 43, at 708-09; see also Turoff, 701 F. Supp. at 989-90;
Salvatore, 110 F.3d at 1139; Martinez, 905 F.2d at 713.
56. See Moohr, supranote 43, at 710; see also Maus, supranote 42, at 1135-36.
The Second Circuit labeled this theory as "patently absurd." United States v. Schwartz,
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license holder to [engage in the particular activity] are tangible, physical objects
that belong to the state."57 Once an individual has lied to obtain the license, then
she has defrauded the state of property.5" Finally, some courts have rested their
holdings upon a "right to control" theory.59 These courts reason that the right to
control expenditures is intangible property for purposes of Section 1341, as is the
"right of 'exclusive control over the persons and type of persons with whom it
6
decides to enter employment agreements and contracts.""'
Under this rationale,
states are allowed to bring an action once they have been "deprived of potentially
valuable economic information."'"
The Fifth Circuit decision United States v. Salvatore6 2 provides an
illustration of one of these theories. In Salvatore,seventeen businessmen were
indicted for their involvement in certain organizations that owned and operated
video poker machines and were also alleged to be members of a nationwide
criminal organization. 63 All seventeen men were charged with mail fraud for
manipulating state licensing requirements and all but three pled guilty. 64 The
three men who did not plead guilty were eventually convicted of federal mail
fraud and they appealed their convictions to the Fifth Circuit.65 The Fifth Circuit
held that the licenses were indeed property in the hands of the state.66 According
to the court, property is traditionally defined as "something of value" and a
"legal bundle of rights." 67 Licenses fall under this definition because they are
something of value, in that the state expects to generate revenue from them.68
The court also characterized the distinction between issued and unissued licenses
as "esoteric" and rejected the theory that the state's interest in the license was
merely regulatory. 69 The court concluded that "a video poker license does not
merely signify government approval of an individual's right to take part in a

924 F.2d 410, 417-18 (2d Cir. 1991). The Eighth Circuit, while recognizing the tangible
quality of the paper, noted that "it is simply negligible-de minimis as a matter of law
and insignificant as a matter of fact, apart from the legal entitlement it represents."
United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1990).
57. Moohr, supra note 43, at 710.
58. Moohr, supra note 43, at 710.
59. Moohr, supra note 43, at 710.
60. Maus, supra note 42, at 1134 (quoting Granberry,908 F.2d at 279-80).
61. Moohr, supra note 43, at 711.
62. 110 F.3d 1131 (5th Cir. 1997).
63. Lemann, supra note 27, at 802 (citing United States v. Salvatore, 110 F.3d
1131, 1135 (5th Cir. 1997)).
64. Lemann, supra note 27, at 803 (citing Salvatore, 110 F.3d at 1136).
65. Lemann, supra note 27, at 803 (citing Salvatore, 1 10 F.3d at 1136).
66. Lemann, supra note 27, at 803 (citing Salvatore, 110 F.3d at 1138).
67. Lemann, supra note 27, at 804 (citing Salvatore, I10 F.3d at 1139-40).
68. Lemann, supra note 27, at 804 (citing Salvatore, 110 F.3d at 1142).
69. Lemann, supra note 27, at 804 (citing Salvatore, 110 F.3d at 1140-41).
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particular regulated industry; it also evinces the state's intent to participate in that
industry. "70

C. The Federalizationof Crime
Under our federalist system, states generally have the primary responsibility
of defining criminal conduct and enforcing criminal laws.7' "States define
criminal conduct and assign penalties deemed appropriate in light of the goals
of criminal law that the state has accepted."72 This role stems from the fact that
most crime is localized, giving the state an immediate interest in defining
criminal conduct and enforcing criminal statutes.73 Practical considerations, such
as the size and experience of local police departments and state investments
in
74
penal institutions and supporting agencies, strengthen the states' interest.
While the early days of our country witnessed limited federal participation
in the realm of criminal law, those days are quickly disappearing, as the federal
government increases its participation in the criminal arena. 75 Federal legislation
making localized conduct subject to federal criminal sanction has increased
dramatically, "[most] notably in areas in which existing state law already
criminalizes the same conduct.

76

One study found that "40% of the federal

criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970."77
This increase in congressional activity is generally considered to be a response
to studies finding that a majority of Americans view crime as a significant

70. Lemann, supra note 27, at 804-05 (quoting Salvatore, 110 F.3d at 1141)

(internal quotation remarks omitted).
71. See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) ("Under our federal
system, the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law."') (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) ("Our national government is one of delegated powers

alone. Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the
States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, has created

offenses against the United States.").
72. Geraldine Szott Moohr, The FederalInterest in CriminalLaw, 47 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 1127, 1132 (1997).

73. Id. at 1132-33.
74. Id. at 1133.
75. Id.
76. JAMES E. STRAZELLA, THE REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 5; see also Kathleen
F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1162 (1995).
77. ABA, supra note 76, at 7.
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national problem and, Congress has enacted numerous federal statutes to
address these concerns.7 9
Myriad criticisms have been leveled at the increase in the federalization of
crime.8" Some have argued that increased federalization is damaging the
federalist framework expressly created by the Constitution."' The argument is
that too much power becomes concentrated in the federal government, and
federal prosecutors are granted jurisdiction to enter into areas traditionally
governed by the states.8 2 Others argue that duplicative federal crimes injure state
independence because federal prosecution creates an alternative source of
authority, 3 and that the functional advantages of our decentralized federal
system are damaged as a result.8" These advantages include "a check on abuse
of federal power, increased opportunities for citizens to participate in
government, creation of diverse cultural and political environments, and
providing laboratories for innovative programs." 5 Finally, many argue that the
increase in federal crime is placing a substantial burden on federal courts in
terms of time and resources expended. 6 Consequently, federal courts are forced
to stray from their primary function, which is to interpret federal law of national
importance. 7
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Cleveland v. United States,"8 the Supreme Court settled the debate that
has divided the federal courts. The Court held that the State of Louisiana did not
part with "property" when it issued a video poker license to Cleveland. 9 The
Court, reiterating its statement in McNally v. United States," declared that "[i]f
Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has."'"
At the outset of its decision, the Court addressed the dispute plaguing the
courts by noting that no genuine dispute was really present because the state's

78. Moohr, supra note 72, at 1128.

79. Moohr, supra note 72, at 1128.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Moohr, supra note 72, at 1128.
ABA, supra note 76, at 24-26.
ABA, supra note 76, at 32-35.
Moohr, supra note 72, at 1128.
Moohr, supra note 72, at 1134.
Moohr, supra note 72, at 1135 n.3 1; see also Brickey, supra note 76, at 1173.
Moohr, supra note 72, at 1135-36; see also ABA supra note 76, at 35-39.
Moohr, supra note 72, at 1136.
531 U.S. 12 (2000).
Id. at 20.
483 U.S. 350 (1987).
Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 20.
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interest in its video poker licenses was clearly a regulatory, rather than a
property, interest.92 The State of Louisiana's licensing scheme was a
paradigmatic regulatory program.93 The state "licenses, subject to certain
conditions, engagement in pursuits that private actors may not undertake without
official authorization."94 The overall program, therefore, was similar to licensing
schemes long classified by the Court as exercises of state police power. 5
While conceding Louisiana's regulatory interest, the government provided
two arguments as to why the state also had a property interest in its video poker
licenses.96 First, the government argued that "the State receives a substantial
sum of money in exchange for each license and continues to receive payments
from the licensee as long as the license remains in effect."97 The Court
acknowledged that the State of Louisiana did have a substantial economic
interest in the video poker industry derived from the various licensing fees, but
the Court questioned how this economic interest created "property" in the hands
of the state.98 The state did not receive the majority of its fees while the licenses
remained in the control of the state, but only after the licenses were issued. 9
Extending this reasoning, the Court concluded that labeling this arrangement as
a property right would grant the state property rights "in any license or permit
requiring an upfront fee, including drivers' licenses, medical licenses, and
fishing and hunting licenses."'00 Those licenses, according to the Court and as
conceded by the government, are "purely regulatory."''
The government also argued that the State of Louisiana had a property
interest in the video poker licenses because it had "significant control over the
issuance, renewal, suspension, and revocation of licenses," and Cleveland,
through the false application, frustrated this "right to control."' 2 The Court
responded to the government's "right to control" theory by noting that this "right
to control" was beyond that which has been traditionally recognized as a
property interest." 3 Further, "intangible rights of allocation, exclusion, and
control amount to no more and no less than Louisiana's sovereign power to

92. Id.
93. Id. at 21.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 21-22, 23.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 22.
103. Id. at 23.
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regulate."' 4 According to the Court, the government notably ignored the fact
that the State of Louisiana also has the right to impose criminal sanctions for
violation of the licensing scheme." 5 This "right to control" was no more a
property right than a "law licensing liquor sales in a State that levies a sales tax
on liquor."'0 6 Regulations of this type are "paradigmatic exercises of the States'
traditional police powers. ' '
After quickly discarding the government's arguments that the state's interest
in a video poker license were analogous to a patent holder's interest in a patent
not yet licensed, or a franchisor's right to select franchisees, the Court provided
an additional basis for holding that the video poker license was not "property"
in the hands of the state. "' The Court stated that to accept the government's
interpretation of the mail fraud statute "[would invite the Court] to approve a
sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear
statement by Congress."' 9 Holding that the issuance of licenses constitutes a
deprivation of property would arm federal prosecutors with the ability to
prosecute a wide array of conduct historically regulated by the states. 10
"[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes."' "
Further, insomuch as the word "property" is riddled with ambiguity, the rule of
lenity mandated that the Court rule in favor of the defendant." 2
The government's final argument was one ofstatutory interpretation. 3 The
government argued that Section 1341, as amended in 1909, created two separate
offenses: (1) "any scheme or artifice to defraud" and (2) "any scheme or artifice
...for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises. ' 114 Because a video poker license was property in
the hands of Cleveland, Cleveland had "obtained property" and committed the
second offense under the mail fraud statute, regardless of whether the license
was property in the hands of the state."' While conceding that the two phrases
seem to appear in the disjunctive, and are therefore independent offenses, the
Court rejected this reading of the statute by stating that "the second phrase

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25 (quoting Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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simply modifies the first 'by ma[king] it unmistakable that the statute reached
false promises and misrepresentations as to the future as well as other frauds
involving money or property.""' 6
In addition, the Court noted that constructing the mail fraud statute as two
separate offenses "would appear to arm federal prosecutors with power to police
false statements in an enormous range of submissions to state and local
authorities.""' 7 As the Court stated earlier, absent a clear statement from
Congress, it would not construe the statute to provide federal oversight over a
wide array of conduct traditionally policed by the states.'
V. COMMENT

Through the use of the clear statement canon, the Supreme Court, like it did
in McNally v. United States, has curbed the expansionist direction of the mail
fraud statute by holding that licenses are not property for purposes of the mail
fraud statute. The expansion of the mail fraud statute has been the subject of
numerous criticisms by both courts".9 and scholars. 2 ' The mail fraud statute is
now being used by federal prosecutors to prosecute all frauds involving virtually
any mailing or communication sent by the United States Post Office or private
carrier, even in areas where the federal interest is questionable.' 2' Problems of
notice,' 22 gap-filling,' 23 and abuse of prosecutorial discretion have exacerbated
the situation.'24 "[Ciritics have been largely unsuccessful in generating either

116. Id. at 26 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 (1987)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 26-27.
119. See, e.g., Emeryv. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995).
120. See, e.g., Peter J.Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be CalledFederalFraud:
The Changing Nature of the Mail FraudStatute, 36 B.C. L. REv. 435 (1995); Gregory
H. Williams, Good Government by ProsecutorialDecree: The Use and Abuse of Mail
Fraud,32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137 (1990).

121. Moohr,supra note 72, at 1160, 1168, 1181.
122. One argument isthat the breadth of the mail fraud statute fails to provide
citizens with adequate notice as to what conduct is unlawful. Todd E. Molz, Comment,
The Mail FraudStatute: An Argumentfor Repeal by Implication, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 983,
984 (1997); see also Jason T. Elder, Comment, Federal Mail Fraud Unleashed:
Revisiting the Criminal Catch-All, 77 OR. L. REv. 707, 730 (1998).
123. Molz notes that the breadth of the mail fraud statute allows "prosecutors,
aided by courts, [to] use the statute to fill gaps in the criminal laws left by Congress,
despite the Constitution's declaration that 'all legislative powers' therein granted are
vested in the Congress." Molz, supra note 122, at 984; see also Brief for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
10, Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) (No. 99-804).
124. See generally Williams, supra note 120.
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legislative amendment, lower court reinterpretation, or Department of Justice
5
rules to control such a broad interpretation of the statute."' 2
Although the mail fraud statute has a history of broad interpretation, this
expansion should not interfere with our federalist framework. As one
commentator has noted, "[a] statute of this breadth, intruding so deeply on the
integral functions of state and local governments, ought to set off all sorts of
federalism alarm bells."' 26 Judicial extension of federal jurisdiction over minor
state offenses, such as fraudulent license applications, would cause intractable
harm to our sensitive federalist infrastructure.' 27 Subjecting the substantial
number of licensing applications in a vast array of areas to federal prosecution
"would allow prosecutors an unleashed power to monitor all of these state
activities."' 28
Federal mail fraud prosecution for every fraudulent state licensing
application is an improper intrusion into the state criminal arena because of the
absence of any recognizable federal interest justifying this intrusion, except for
the fictional notion of preserving the integrity of the postal system. 9 The states
clearly have the stronger interest in regulating this type of criminal behavior.
The Supreme Court has traditionally characterized licensing schemes as
exercises of state police powers. 30 The federal government's lack of interest is
nicely summed up by Judge Easterbrook in Toulabi v. United States, a case
involving a mail fraud licensing prosecution, in which he stated "[w]hy the
United States should be so interested in enforcing the laws of the City of
Chicago is something of a mystery.... State and local governments commonly
prosecute violations of their own laws."''
While the Court in Cleveland partially rested its holding on the federalism
principle by noting that characterizing licenses as property would allow federal
prosecutors to enter areas historically regulated by the states, it did expound an
important qualification: Congress, if it so desires, may enact legislation
subjecting state licensing fraud to federal prosecution. 132 Congress, however,
should be wary of following the same course of action it took after the McNally
decision.'
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court suggest that it is "laying the

125. Williams, supra note 120, at 138.
126. George D. Brown, Should FederalismShield Corruption?-MailFraud,
State
Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 225,248 (1997).
127. Criminal Defense Lawyers Brief, supra note 123, at 6; see supra notes 71-87
& accompanying text.
128. Criminal Defense Lawyers Brief, supra note 123, at 10.
129. See Moohr, supra note 72, at 1160.
130. Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 22 (2000).
131. Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122, 123 (7th Cir. 1989).
132. Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24.
133. See supra note 35.
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groundwork for a broader reexamination of national power."'34 These decisions
emphasize the "desire of several justices to emphasize dual federalism as a
general guiding concept."' The Court has recognized the existence of an
"inviolable zone of state sovereignty," which may place "external limits" on
Congress's exercise of enumerated powers.'36 Furthermore, "internal limits" on
Congressional power may present an additional avenue for invalidating a mail
fraud statute that allows federal prosecution of state licensing fraud.'37 As one
commentator has noted, "assertions of authority under any grant of power should
now be open to question in order to preserve the principle of a limited national
government which Chief Justice Rehnquist identified as fundamental."' 38
Consequently, Congressional amendment of the mail fraud statute to include
federal prosecution of fraudulent state licensing applications may force the
Supreme Court to "bite the constitutional bullet," rather than once again
narrowing the statute through the clear statement canon, and seriously consider
the validity of the mail fraud statute."39
VI. CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Cleveland is a victory for states' rights, even though
the victory is indeed weakened by the Court's utilization of the clear statement
canon. The license conflict, however, was not the appropriate scenario for the
Court to lay a new chapter in its federalism jurisprudence. The Court took the
responsible course by avoiding the potential constitutional problems posed by
characterizing licenses as property for purposes of the mail fraud statute through
the use of the clear statement canon. Congressional amendment in response to
the Cleveland decision, however, may end up resulting in a Supreme Court
decision of monumental import.
HADI S. AL-SHATHIR

134. Brown, supranote 126, at 227; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992).
135. Brown, supra note 126, at 268.

136. Brown, supra note 126, at 259-77. Professor Brown defines "external limits"
as "constraints upon congressional action that have their source in some provision or

principle of the constitution other than the power Congress seeks to exercise." Id. at 226
n.17.
137. Brown, supranote 126, at 249-59. Professor Brown defines "internal limits"
as congressional utilization of "a specific enumerated power to reach a subject matter
beyond the scope of that power." Id. at 226 n.17.
138. Brown, supra note 126, at 253-54.
139. See Brown, supranote 126, at 296.
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